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1 Introduction
Most individuals, on their own, do not save adequately for their retirement (Diamond, 1977;
Poterba, 2014). Standard models of life-cycle consumption have di¢ culty rationalizing this un-
dersaving especially in the context of retirement savings. In an e¤ort to overcome this hurdle,
researchers have incorporated elements of present-biasedness in the preferences of individuals.
Prominent among such attempts have been the inclusion of myopia (Feldstein, 1985; Andersen
and Bhattacharya, 2011) and time-inconsistency (Laibson et. al. 1998) in peoples preferences.
These endeavors see Chetty (2015) often utilize a) the notion that individuals are comprised of
multiple selves, possibly in conict with one another, and b) the construct of a chasm between a
selfs true preferences(experienced utility), that which he uses to determine how much he should
save, versus his choiceor behavioralpreferences (decision utility), that which determines how
much he actually saves.1 The latter can help rationalize the gap between actual and best-intention
saving if, for example, the choice preferences of the current self attach a lower weight on future
utility than his true preferences do this is present-bias from the standpoint of the true self.
There may be disagreements between the choice preferences of the current self and his future
selves. Time-inconsistent preferences (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) help explain the gap between
what the current, decision-making self wishes a future self to save and what that self, when his
turn to decide arrives, actually does. Here, the choice preferences exhibit preference reversal : the
future self, for example, may wish to revise downward the previous selfs forward-looking, best-
intention saving plans this is undersaving, from the standpoint of the previous self.2 Cognizant
of the impending preference reversal, a sophisticated self may seek commitment devices, such as
mandatory pensions, to help his future selves stick to his better judgment about retirement saving
see Summers (1989), Laibson et. al. (1998), and Kaplow (2008). The agent, so the argument
goes, uses the commitment device, ends up with more retirement wealth, and is made better o¤.
Evidently, present-biasedness and time inconsistency preferences can rationalize private un-
dersaving in lifecycle models. What is not apparent, at least not in theory, is whether pension
mandates leave the agent with increased retirement wealth. The reason is, with perfect capital
markets, present-biased individuals can o¤set the mandated saving by reducing their own, even
one-for-one  if need be, borrow against their future pension wealth  leaving total retirement
wealth unchanged, possibly lower. (This ine¤ectiveness result is well-known in the theoretical
pensions literature see Gale, 1998.) Which raises the question, why are they so popular? 3 This
1Myopia means the agent places less weight on the future than his true preferences would suggest while time-
inconsistent preferences imply preference reversal : the relative weight placed by the current self on current versus
future utility changes as the lifecycle proceeds.
2For expositional ease, the introduction restricts the discussion only to time-inconsistent preferences exhibiting
preference-reversal across choice selves. As the body of the paper will make clear, all major assertions will also be
true under myopia, present bias from the standpoint of the true self.
3Many countries (Australia, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Mexico, Norway, Poland, and many others) have
mandatory pension schemes, either mandated by law or via labor market negotiations or contracts, requiring indi-
viduals to contribute a certain fraction of their income during their entire work career towards their own retirement.
(OECD, 2015). These range from 6% in New Zealand to 33% in Italy, once employer and employee mandates are
added up. The contribution rates are typically age-independent, and is, therefore, the same for the young, the
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is our point of entry into this literature. We seek a welfare rationale for mandated pensions. We
nd that pension mandates are great commitment devices, e¤ective at raising retirement wealth
not by compelling agents to raise their private saving but by forcing them to stop saving on their
own!
The customary way to restore policy e¤ectiveness in life cycle models is to assume, implicitly
or explicitly, agents face borrowing constraints see e.g. Feldstein (1985), Laibson et. al (1998),
Feldstein and Leibman (2002), Imrohoroglu et. al. (2003), and Cremer et. al. (2008). Under
this assumption, the government mandates a su¢ ciently-high level of pension saving, enough to
compel agents to stop saving on their own and, yet, not be allowed to borrow; from this point on,
further increases in the mandate generate a proportional increase in retirement saving. We argue
the no-borrowing constraint assumption is not entirely innocuous. Our reasoning is simple: in the
natural course of a lifecycle, as has been well documented, agents facing a hump-shaped income
prole are net borrowers when young, net savers when middle aged, and dissavers when old see,
for example, Figure 3.2 in Coeurdacier et. al. 2015. for data on the U.S. In that case, why mandate
the young to save for retirement at a time they most want to borrow? We take a quick look at the
evidence.
Figure 1a: Fraction contributing to mandated
pensions
Note: Contribution rates to mandated labour market pensions for the age group 25-59 in 2014
computed as payments into labour market pension arrangements as a % of wage income. Source:
Danish Ministry for Economic and Interior A¤airs (2014).
In Figure 1a, we document the distribution of the entire Danish population of wage earners in
2014 according to their mandatory contribution rates (into mandated, funded individual retirement
middle-aged and those close to retirement. One exception is Switzerland which has employee pension contribution
rates increasing with age (four age groups) rising from 7% for individual in the age group 25-34 to 18% for the age
group 55-65 (55-64 for women). Bateman et. al (2001) contains a detailed review of mandatory saving schemes across
OECD countries.
3
accounts). Evidently, more than 70% of wage earners contribute excess of 10% of their earned
income into such schemes.
Figure 1b: Share of wage earners with net debt
Note: Share of families with net-debt according to the age of the oldest member of the family
in 2012. Pension wealth and housing equity are included. Source: Andersen et. al (2012).
Figure 1b illustrates the fraction of people in various age-groups in the entire Danish population
with net debt; for example, roughly 60% of 25-29 year olds have net debt. The two gures together
suggest many young households are borrowing, and at the same time, contributing to mandatory
pension schemes.4 Similar patterns are observed in most OECD countries, including the U.S. 
see Figure 1c which suggests a positive correlation between pension wealth and household debt as
percentages of income.
Figure 1c: Cross-country evidence on pension wealth
and household debt
Note: Households pension wealth and gross debt in percentage of disposable income, 2012;
Source: www.oecd-ilibrary.orgndatabase (National accounts at a glance).
4 In addition to the income their own retirement accounts will generate, Danish wage earners will, upon retirement,
receive a means-tested, pay-as-you-pension.
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A model which imposes a no-borrowing constraint, especially on the young, and uses it to
rationalize mandatory pensions is therefore at odds with the well-known borrowing and saving
characteristics of the life cycle. The challenge, we take up, is to o¤er a welfare rationale for manda-
tory pensions in an otherwise standard life-cycle model with present-biased preferences without
imposing any borrowing constraints.5 Since most countries that impose mandatory pension con-
tributions do so in an age-independent fashion, our question becomes extra challenging, how to
rationalize such saving mandates on the young who also happen to be natural borrowers?6
At rst glance, it would appear mandates of the dened contribution type (individual accounts)
should not matter; after all, they do not change the present value of (disposable) income, only its
time prole. If capital markets are imperfect here, we mean, the direction in which income shifts
across time a¤ects its opportunity cost  then the time prole of income matters, and marginal
utility of consumption across time is not equalized.7 How, then, can such mandates be welfare
enhancing? As we explain below, present-bias in preferences, in conjunction with capital market
imperfections, is key.
We conduct our analysis in a standard three-period lifecycle model. Homogeneous agents face an
exogenous, hump-shaped income prole and are assumed to have present-biased choice preferences 
quasi-hyperbolic (time-inconsistent) preferences and myopia; their true preferences admit standard
discounting but no short-sightedness or myopia.8 We assume the agents are sophisticated: they
understand their impending preference reversal and respond to it. The consumption-loan market
is imperfect  there is an interest gap, the borrowing rate exceeds the saving rate (which, in
turn, exceeds unity), both exogenously specied. The pension scheme is of the mandatory, dened-
contribution type with individual accounts and can admit age-specic contribution rates. Agents
face no borrowing constraints; indeed, they may borrow against their future income and pension
wealth. The government is benevolent and chooses pension contribution rate(s) to maximize lifetime
utility of the true young self.
Our results conrm that present-biased preferences imply the young borrow too much and the
middle-aged save too little relative to what the true young self would want. This sets the stage for
government intervention. Under mild conditions on the extent of present-biasedness and the size of
the interest gap, we show there may be a welfare case for mandating the middle-aged and the young
to contribute to their retirement savings, even with age-independent contribution rates.9 And this
5Goda et.al (2015) present evidence on the ubiquity of present-biasedness (roughly, 55%) seen in Americans. They
also nd a robust negative relationship between between retirement savings and the extent of present-bias.
6By natural borrowers, we mean the young facing a hump-shaped income prole would want to borrow even if
their preferences were not present-biased.
7 In particular, the marginal utility of young-age consumption is higher (relative to the perfect markets case), if
the young want to front-load consumption but are restrained from so doing (say, due to a higher interest rate on
borrowing relative to saving, and/or an explicit borrowing constraint). Mandating the young to save, therefore,
reduces their current disposable income and utility, misaligning marginal utility of consumption across the life-cycle
even further.
8Bounded rationality can also be perceived as a so-called self-control problem see Gul and Pesendorfter (2001,
2004). For an analysis of the design of pension schemes under such preferences in two-period overlapping generations
models, see St-Amant and Garon (2015).
9 If present-biasedness is absent, there is no role for mandated pensions true and choice preferences agree and
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is consistent with the young simultaneously borrowing and saving (via mandated pensions), albeit
at di¤erent opportunity costs.
The larger issue is, given the low self-provision for retirement by the middle aged, how should
policy be designed to boost old-age consumption? Simply mandating the middle-aged to save more,
initially, has no e¤ect: they simply undo the mandate by cutting own saving. As mandated contri-
butions rise, a point is reached where the middle-aged nd themselves saving nothing voluntarily
the zero-saving corner. Further increases in contributions, within limits, raise overall (mandated
plus voluntary) retirement saving beyond what voluntary saving could achieve alone. The true
young self likes this.
The question is, with the middle-aged pinned at the zero-saving corner, should the young
be co-opted in the larger mission of uplifting old-age consumption? The answer is, it depends. A
pension mandate on the young raises future pension wealth and helps to raise old-age consumption,
something the young true self appreciates. At the same time, though, it reduces current income
for the young encouraging them to borrow more but not so much because of the interest gap 
as to totally o¤set the gain in future pension wealth. How is the middle-aged a¤ected? The added
cost of debt repayment tends to reduce the middle-aged selfs consumption, contrary to what his
true young self would have wanted. Therein lies the trade-o¤, boost old-age consumption but hurt
middle-age consumption. This is why present-bias is necessary but not su¢ cient to rationalize
mandated saving; the extent of the credit market imperfection is crucial.
What insight do we glean from the discussion above? In our setup, e¤ectiveness of a mandated
pension relies on it being aggressive enough to induce the middle-aged from saving on their own! The
task of ensuring the retired have su¢ cient savings is to be taken up solely by the government. This
insight must appear counterintuitive; why is it not optimal to have both the government mandate
and voluntary saving by the middle-aged? The answer lies in the present-bias. The government
wants the young self to contribute to future pension wealth (and hence, old-age consumption)
but it is aware the young sophisticated self will borrow against that future wealth and inuence
the middle-aged self to save less. However, if the middle-aged can be pinned at the zero-saving
corner, then, unless the policy is too pushy, the actions of the young self will leave no mark on the
middle-aged. They continue to save nothing on their own merely contributing to their retirement
as mandated. The take-away is that mandatory pensions work by relieving the middle-aged of the
task of self-provision for retirement, which, in e¤ect, renders their present-bias inconsequential.
We turn to a quick review of the literature. Imrohoroglu et. al (2003) is a seminal work studying
the desirability of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes for naive, quasi-hyperbolic discounters,
assuming no borrowing is possible. In that case, unfunded schemes yield no benet and may hurt,
as is often the case, they are return-dominated by private saving. Our analysis is an apples-to-
apples comparison between private saving and mandatory saving, each bearing the same rate of
return; this means a shift from voluntary to mandated saving has no return consequences.10 In
there is no over/under saving problem to correct.
10Cremer and Pestieu (2011) consider a PAYG scheme in a two-period model with homogeneous agents where, in
the absence of a no-borrowing constraint, there is no welfare case for such pensions. Their concern is more about
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an insightful new paper, Findley and Caliendo (2016) extend the Imrohoroglu et. al (2003) line
of work to allow for borrowing, as well, like us, a spread between borrowing and saving rates.
In a lot of ways, their paper is very similar in spirit as ours, except they use a continuous-time
OG structure with time-invariant wage income, and as such, cannot make meaningful statements
concerning di¤erent magnitudes of responses to saving mandates by the young and the middle-aged.
Malin (2008) considers the implications of pay-as-you-go social security acting as a oor on savings
in a model with heterogenous, time-inconsistent agents. In our setup, a uniform oor will bind for
some levels of present-biasedness but not all because the scheme is fully funded.
A relatively large empirical literature has analyzed how household savings is a¤ected by in-
centives and mandated saving requirements. In particular, the Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs) and 401(k) programs in the US have been much researched. A symposium in the Journal
of Economic Perspectives summarizes the ndings and shows the di¤erence in opinions and results
based on analyses of the very same programs see Hubbard and Skinner (1996), Poterba, Venti
and Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996). The consensus appears to be, such incen-
tives may increase saving, but the relevant elasticities are small, suggesting many agents are not
responding to incentives. More recently, Alessie et. al. (2013) and Blau (2016) nd evidence for the
displacement e¤ect of pension wealth on household savings. Access to microdata makes it possible
to better assess the determinants of savings. In an inuential study, Chetty et al. (2014) use Danish
data and exploit increases in mandated pension contributions at job shifts to identify the e¤ects of
mandated saving on total savings. They nd about 85% of individuals are so-called passive savers;
for them, an increase in mandated saving leads to a one-to-one increase in total savings, with no
adjustment in other forms of savings. (One can think of these people as behaving like agents at the
zero-saving corner alluded to above.) About 15% respond to the mandated savings requirement
mainly by changing other forms of savings, i.e., their total savings is not much a¤ected.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the three-period model while Section 3
derives the saving decisions of the young and the middle-aged when savings and borrowing rates
di¤er. As a prelude to the full-blown analysis for the entire lifecycle, Section 4 studies a welfare
rationale for mandated pensions in a two-period model. The role for mandated pension savings
in the life-cycle model is considered in Section 5, including an analysis of whether there can be
a welfare rationale for mandating the young to save for pensions, and whether there is a welfare
rationale even if the contribution rate is age-independent. Section 6 concludes the paper. Proofs
and some additional material are relegated to the appendix.
redistribution via a PAYG scheme (seen most clearly, in the case where all agents are non-myopic) and not about
whether such schemes solve the present-bias problem.
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2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
To capture the essentials of the life-cycle pattern of borrowing and saving, we consider a simple,
three-period lifecycle model.11 Population size is held xed.12 A representative agent lives through
three phases, young (y), middle-aged (m) and old (o), and is endowed with exogenous incomes
wy > 0 and wm (> wy) during youth and middle-age respectively, and nothing when old  in
other words, a hump-shaped income prole in accordance with stylized facts. At times, we will
interchangeably refer to these phases as selves, where Self 1 (young self) is the young phase, and
so on. Agents have access to a capital market where the gross return on saving is R (> 1) but the
borrowing rate is Rb  R > 1 : borrowing faces a higher opportunity cost than saving.1314 All
borrowing and saving is for consumption purposes only.
We allow agents to act myopically and have quasi-hyperbolic preferences (exhibit time-inconsistent
behavior). We draw a distinction between the trueand choiceutility of agents. Agentsbe-
havior is dictated by their choice utility, but their actual well-being, our measure of welfare, is
governed by the true lifetime utility.15 Let cy denote consumption as young, cm denote consump-
tion as middle-aged, and co be consumption as old. The true preferences, with a *, dened
over consumption in each period of life is the standard, separable

  u (cy) + u (cm) + ()2 u (co) (1)
where  2 [0; 1]. The felicity function u() is assumed to fulll standard assumptions, including
u0() > 0 and u00() < 0 and Inada conditions.16 Our yardstick of welfare is 
; the lifetime true
utility of Self 1. The choice preferences when young (of Self 1) are given as

  u (cy) + 

u (cm) + 
2u (co)

= u (cy) + e [u (cm) + u (co)] (2)
11Three periods are necessary and su¢ cient to capture the essence of the natural life-cycle pattern (borrowing as
young, saving as middle-aged and dissaving as old). The model is deliberately kept barebones so as to reveal the
intuition in stark fashion. Ignored are heterogenities in income or present-biasedness (as in Malin, 2008), mortality
risk, uncertainty, bequest motives, retirement decisions, transactions costs, among others.
12 It is unproblematic to allow for young or middle-age mortality when perfect annuities markets are present. In the
presence of market imperfections additional issues arise since the mandated pension scheme may (partially) overcome
this market failure if it o¤ers life-annuities, see e.g. Eckstein et al (1985). This points to market imperfections as a
separate reason for public intervention, which we leave out to focus on the implications of present-biased preferences.
13Letting Rb !1 generates a no-borrowing constraint as a special case.
14Note that our assumption on returns make incomes "imperfect substitutes" over time in the case of borrowing!
To make voluntary and mandatory savings non-perfect substitutes, Gale and Scholz (1994) presents a three-period
OLG model where they introduce income uncertainty in period 2 which creates a precautionary demand for saving
that is not satised by tied pension savings. Chetty et al (2014) introduces a specic utility gain from the exibility
available with voluntary saving.
15Findley and Caliendo (2016) consider other welfare criteria.
16 In some places below, we illustrate some results for a logarithmic utility function, i.e. u() = ln().
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and of Self 2 (when middle-aged) as
u (cm) + eu (co) (3)
where  2 [0; 1],    and e    .
Note  < 1 represents quasi-hyperbolic preferences which generate time inconsistency (prefer-
ence reversal) since the marginal rate of substitution (M.R.S) between consumption as middle-aged
and old from the view point of Self 1, @cm@co jyoung=  
u0(co)
u0(cm) and the same M.R.S
@cm
@co
jmiddle-aged=
  u0(co)u0(cm) =  e u0(co)u0(cm) from the point of view of Self 2 are not the same (Laibson,1997). Also, if
present bias arises solely due to myopia ( = 1;  = e) there is no di¤erence in the MRSs, and
therefore, no preference reversal. Similarly, if  =  but  < 1; there is no myopia but preference
reversal persists. In Figure 2, the true preferences of Self 1 for cm and co are shown by the green
indi¤erence curve, with discount factor : The blue indi¤erence curve captures Self 1s preferences
for the same with corresponding discount factor  < . For Self 2: the red curve captures his
choice preferences over cm and co; that which he as middle-aged uses to make decisions, with an
attached discount factor,  = e < :
Figure 2: True vs. Choice utility
There is a mandatory, dened-contribution pension scheme with individual accounts to which
the young and middle-aged are required to contribute a share y 2 [0; 1] and m 2 [0; 1] of their
respective incomes.17 This means, pension-mandated (henceforth mandatory) saving is ywy and
mwm for the young and middle-aged respectively. The gross return on the pension contribution is
17The government is assumed to pre-commit to these contribution rates. For an insightful analysis of these issues
in the absence of such precommittment, see Findley and Caliendo (2014).
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R (R > 1), i.e., the mandatory scheme o¤ers the same return as voluntary saving.18 The individual
is entitled to a pension benet (P ) in the third period where
P = R2ywy +Rmwm: (4)
The agents are assumed to perceive the relationship between their contributions and the benet
they receive. The agent considers his entire future pension wealth, P; as something he can borrow
against.19
Denoting voluntary saving as young by sy and saving as middle-aged by sm, consumption as
old is
co =
(
P +Rsm for sm  0
P +Rbsm for sm < 0
;
as middle-aged is,
cm =
(
(1  m)wm +Rsy   sm for sy  0
(1  m)wm +Rbsy   sm for sy < 0
;
and as young by
cy = (1  y)wy   sy:
If sy  0 and sm  0, (no borrowing as young and middle-aged) the present value of lifetime
income is Iss  (1 y)wy+ (1 m)wmR + PR2 = wy+ wmR which holds because the agent is cognizant of
the link between his contributions and eventual benets. In this case, pension contribution rates do
not inuence the budget sets of the various selves. However, if sy < 0 and sm  0, the present value
of lifetime income is given by Ibs  (1 y)wy+ (1 m)wmRb +
P
RRb
=

(1  y) + RRb y

wy+
wm
Rb
< Iss;
evidently, R 6= Rb matters here, which is why the contribution rates inuence budget sets. If
both sy; sm < 0, then the present value of lifetime income is Ibb 

(1  y) +

R
Rb
2
y

wy +h
R
Rb
m + (1  m)
i
wm
Rb
< Ibs:
Henceforth, we restrict attention to sy < 0 and sm > 0, the most relevant case, as discussed in
the introduction. (The appendices admit the case, sm < 0:) To avoid confusion, dene by   sy > 0
which means an increase in borrowing is simply an increase in by: Then,
co = P +Rsm; cm = (1  m)wm  Rbby   sm; cy = (1  y)wy + by: (5)
18Mandatory savings funds have access to the same capital market products as do private savers, and hence the
returns are assumed to be identical. It may be argued that mandated schemes can deliver higher net returns due
to lower marketing and transactions (economies of scale) costs. On the other hand, the governance structure may
distort the objectives of the investment policies in mandated pension funds.
19 In reality, that may not be entirely so. If, for example, borrowing requires the agent to put up collateral, it may
be that pension wealth is not accepted as collateral by lenders. We touch on this below.
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3 Voluntary saving
3.1 Middle-aged saving
We focus on so-called sophisticated myopics, that is, we posit Self 1 is aware Self 2s decisions are
based on (3) and not on u (cm) +u (co).20 Evidently, it most challenging to rationalize mandatory
pensions for sophisticated myopics.
The rst order of business is to characterize the individual saving decisions as young and middle-
aged for given contribution rates. We will proceed in the usual backward way  the perception-
perfect strategy of ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) by nding optimal saving sm for the middle-aged
given borrowing by the young, by; and incorporating that response back into the borrowing decision
of the young.
Figure 3: Middle-age voluntary saving
Let Y  (1 m)wm  Rbby: Given a by > 0; the budget set for period 2 and 3 is cm+ coR = Y + PR
if the middle-aged agent is a saver and cm + coRb = Y +
P
Rb
if a borrower, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Since Rb > R; there is a kink in the budget set (the bold green line segments) at sm = 0: Also note,
for a saver cm + sm = Y , cm +D = wm  Rbby where D  (mwm + sm) : That is a middle-aged
saver can be thought of as having income wm   Rbby from which he puts away D : mwm is the
mandatory savings part and sm is the voluntary savings part, and importantly, each part earns the
same return. Using P = R2ywy+Rmwm; we can also write co = P +Rsm = R2ywy+RD which
claries that a middle aged saver cares about total-saving, D; not its composition.
20The alternative case has so-called naive myopics, who do not perceive the upcoming change in their preferences.
In Appendix A, we briey consider this case and argue that results remain unchanged qualitatively. When agents
choose both saving and their retirement, it is critical whether agents are sophisticated or naive, see Diamond and
Köszegi (2003) and Finlay and Coliendo (2015).
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Given a by; Self 2s choice utility is given by u (wm  Rbby  D (by)) + eu (P +Rsm) and the
budget constraint is cm + co=R = Y + PR : The relevant rst order condition is
 u0 (wm  Rbby  D (by)) + eRu0  R2ywy +RD (by) = 0; sm > 0 (6)
The second-order condition is satised given the assumptions made on u. Self 2 is at a corner with
zero voluntary savings, i.e., sm = 0, if
u0 ((1  m)wm  Rbby) > eRbu0  R2ywy +Rmwm (7)
which, it is noteworthy, holds for a range of by:21 Note, the saving vs. no-saving regime cuto¤s
depend on the pension contribution rates.22 This means that increases in contribution rates may
change the identity of a middle-aged agent from a saver to a non-saver. We will return to this
shortly. Figure 3 illustrate the cases where the middle-aged is a voluntary saver, at a zero saving
corner, or is borrowing.23
It can be checked (from (6)),
@D
@by
=
@sm
@by
=
2 (0; Rb) if sm > 0
0 if sm = 0
(8)
Higher borrowing by Self 1 (higher by) reduces starting wealth for Self 2 reduces Y and shrinks
the budget set, see the dotted green lines who reacts by decreasing his saving for consumption
smoothing reasons. This is the wealth e¤ect. To foreshadow, all else same, the government by
incentivizing the young to raise by reduces voluntary saving by the middle-aged; this hurts the
middle-aged.
3.2 Borrowing by the young
The sophisticated Self 1 takes the saving behavior of his future self into account and gures out his
best response. Lifetime choice utility as perceived by Self 1 is
u ((1  y)wy + by) + e u ((1  m)wm  Rbby  D (by)) + u  RD (by) +R2ywy
where D (by) is determined by (6). The rst-order condition reads8<:u
0 (cy) + e [ u0 (cm) + Ru0 (co)]@D(by)@by   eRbu0 (cm) = 0 if D (by) > mwm , sm > 0
u0 (cy)  eRbu0 (cm) = 0 if D (by) = mwm , sm = 0 (9)
21To avoid discontinuities, Findley and Caliendo (2016) smoothaway the interest rate spread. This allows them
to stay away from zero-saving corners that are inuential in our discussion. In other words, the agents in their model
cannot be passive in the sense of Chetty. et. al (2014) as each one of them would actively respond to changes in
the policy.
22Of course, if y = m = 0, the middle-aged will save at any R to ensure some consumption when old.
23Note the zero saving corner is not due to prodigalityas in Pestieau and Possen (2008) where some choose not
to save knowing they will be bailed out later by the government.
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The second order condition is assumed to hold.
At rst sight it may appear, given sm > 0 was optimally chosen by the middle-aged, the term
attached to @D(by)@by  capturing how the saving decision of the middle-aged is inuenced by the
young must get washed out by the envelope theorem. Not so here. The reason is the preference
reversal: how the young views intertemporal substitution between middle and old age, and sets
 u0 (cm) + Ru0 (co) = 0 with attached discount rate , is not how the middle-aged (see eq.(6))
views the same (and sets  u0 (cm) + eRu0 (co) = 0 with discount rate e).
Figure 4: The r.h.s and l.h.s of eq. (10)
Notice from (9) that, in the usual textbook setting, the choice for Self 1 (a borrower) between
cy and cm would be governed, simply by eRbu0 (cm) = u0 (cy) where the r.h.s is the marginal benet
of borrowing an extra unit for young-age consumption and the l.h.s is the discounted marginal cost
of reduced middle-aged consumption. Here, an additional term emerges so that
eRbu0 (cm)  e  u0 (cm) + Ru0 (co)@D (by)
@by

| {z }
Q(by)
= u0 (cy) (10)
Since Self 1 and Self 2 disagree on the correct discount factor, specically  > e; we have  u0 (cm)+
Ru0 (co) > 0 (instead of (9)) and since
@D(by)
@by
< 0, the underscored term  call it Q(by)  is
positive, adding to the previously-discussed marginal cost, thereby raising the total marginal cost
of borrowing. This extra cost arises because Self 1s borrowing restricts the feasible set for Self 2
and because Self 1 and Self 2 disagree on the correct discount factor, both of which the sophisticated
Self 1 must internalize. This means Self 1 is made better o¤ by choosing a lower level of borrowing,
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as clear from Figure 4.
Alternatively, use (8) and (9) to get
 u0 (cy) + eR    e@D (by)
@by

+Rbeu0 (co) = 0 (11)
Notice, the term

   e @D(by)@by appears because the sophisticated Self 1 correctly anticipates the
upcoming preference reversal; hence, the envelope theorem does not apply.24 Curiously, notice if
@D(by)
@by
= 0 (which happens when sm = 0; the zero-saving corner), then preference reversal has no
bite! If Self 1 cannot inuence Self 2s saving by changing his own borrowing, the only instrument
in his arsenal, then whether Self 1 anticipates the preference reversal or not makes no di¤erence.
To foreshadow, if the government can keep the middle-aged at the zero-saving corner, then, in a
sense, it has cured that agent of the preference-reversal problem.
Figure 5: E¤ect of by on sm
The discussion above makes clear that Self 1 is made better o¤ by cutting borrowing. What
impact does this have on Self 2? In Figure 5, Self 1 (using the blue indi¤erence curve) would like
Self 2 to consume at point B. However, Self 2 using the red indi¤erence curve (which is steeper,
since  > e) prefers point A. Knowing this, Self 1 can inuence the budget set of Self 2 by cutting
borrowing (from by to b0y). It is apparent from the gure this shifts out the budget set, allowing Self
2 to, say, choose point C. As drawn, Self 1 has, via this action, ensured Self 2 chooses the same c0
as Self 1 would have liked (as per point B). Intuitively, what is going on here is that the preference
reversal, via the tilting of the indi¤erence curves (from blue to red) causes a substitution e¤ect
24 In the special case of puremyopia ( = 1;  = e) or for naive agents (see Appendix A) this term drops out.
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which hurts Self 1; the former responds by transferring some income (reduced by) to Self 2, an
income e¤ect, to help Self 2 save more for old-age which, in turn helps Self 1. This comes at a
cost: consumption during middle age is higher, and by implication, it is smaller as young after
all, point C may not be optimal.
In passing, recall that the entire analysis above was predicated on Self 1 being a borrower. We
show that
Lemma 1 Self 1 is a borrower if wy is su¢ ciently small relative to wm:
In Appendix B, we show that a su¢ cient condition for Self 1 to borrow is that his income as
young not be too large.25 Henceforth, we assume the conditions spelled out in Lemma 1 hold in
the rest of the paper.
3.3 Changes in the contribution rates
How do the middle-aged react to an increase in their contribution rate? Note
@D
@m
=
(
0() @sm@m =  wm if sm > 0
 wm () @sm@m = 0 if sm = 0
meaning, total-saving is una¤ected  the agent, as alluded to above, does not care about the
composition of total-saving and therefore o¤sets any increase in mandatory saving by cutting his
voluntary saving. It follows,
@cm
@m
= 0;
@co
@m
= 0
This is a restatement of a well-known, policy ine¤ectiveness result  see Gale, 1998  on the
neutrality of fully-funded pension schemes. The implication is stark and important: unless the
middle-aged is at the zero-saving corner, changes in the pension contribution rate have no e¤ect
on his retirement saving (the pension o¤set is a full 100%). If the agent is a saver, his present-
biasedness and freedom to borrow against the future will goad him to undo any e¤ort by the
government aimed at boosting his saving. At the zero corner, however, he is pinned; he cannot
continue o¤setting the mandate, and hence, his present-biasedness is rendered harmless.26
Lemma 2 When middle-aged saving is positive,
sm > 0 :
 @by@m = 0 @sm@m =  wm < 0 
25Obviously, this holds for wy = 0. However, we need a positive wage income for Self 1so as to be able to pose the
question, does it make sense for the young to be mandated to save for pensions.
26See Appendix D for a discussion of the separate role of  and :
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and when it is at the zero corner,
sm = 0 :

@by
@y
> 0 @sm@y = 0
@by
@m
= 0 @sm@m = 0
 :
As discussed above, when the middle-aged are savers, a higher m levied on the middle-aged
has no e¤ect on by of the young or D for middle-aged. On the other hand, a higher contribution
rate on the young, y; induced the young to borrow more  lower young income (net of pension
contributions) and higher retirement income both induce borrowing, but the crowding out is not
complete because borrowing has a higher opportunity return. Self 1 leaves Self 2 (the middle-aged) a
lower starting wealth inducing the latter to further reduce saving. In passing, note that if the middle
aged were borrowing, then an increase in m would cause them to borrow even more, which would
bring down their old-age consumption such an increase in m is, of course, counterproductive,
our goal being to raise, not reduce old-age consumption. This explains why a government would
not want to raise m so high as to drive the middle-aged to borrow.
3.4 Undersaving
We want to establish that in the absence of policy, agents undersaveboth as young and middle-
aged, i.e., they borrow too much as young and save too little as middle-aged: by > by and
sm < s

m where the * denotes solutions derived using true utilities, 

.
We continue to restrict focus on young borrowers. Under laissez faire, voluntary saving as
middle-aged will be strictly positive (they are natural savers  after all, this is the only way
to ensure some consumption as old): The saving decision of the middle-aged is determined us-
ing  u0 (wm  Rbby   sm) + eRu0 (Rsm) = 0 while sm is derived from  u0  wm  Rbby   sm +
Ru0 (Rsm) = 0; the di¤erence between the two problems, given a by; is just that the true prefer-
ences use  while the choice preferences use e: Similarly, borrowing as young, by; is derived from
 u0 (wy + by)+e [ u0 (cm) + Rbu0 (co)] @sm@by +eRbu0 (wm  Rbby   sm) = 0 and by is derived using
 u0  wy + by + Rbu0  wm  Rbby   sm = 0: In this case, the di¤erence between the two prob-
lems is more substantial: the sophisticated young under choice preferences has to contend with the
fact that his middle-aged self will attempt to undo his action a concern that arises only because
of time-inconsistency, which the young under true preferences does not have to contend with.
Proposition 1 by > by and sm < sm obtain, i.e., agents borrow too much as young and save
too littleas middle-aged compared to what their true selves want.
Intuitively, a present-biased young agent would want to borrow more than his true young self
would. However, this would leave his present-biased Self 2 with a lower starting wealth legitimizing
Self 2s choice of lower saving, lower than what true Self 2 would have wanted. If mandatory pensions
are to be justied, then they have to help reduce the severity of this undersavingproblem.
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4 A welfare case for mandatory pensions: The two period model
As a prelude to the analysis of the full life-cycle model, it is useful to study the two-period case27
(middle-aged and old) so as to clarify the key roles played by the crowding-out of private savings
and the capital market structure. The two-period model is also the most commonly studied in the
pensions literature see a review of the literature in Cremer and Pestieau (2011). Note, in the
two-period setting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting and myopia are indistinguishable. Also, with no
old-age income, there is a natural saving (but no borrowing) motive on the part of the middle-aged.
The question is, is there a welfare rationale for mandatory pension saving (m > 0) when welfare
assessed in terms of true preferences 
 = u(cm) + u(co)? Present-biased preferences imply the
middle-aged undersave, but can mandated pension saving help solve this problem?28
Figure 6: co and sm against m
Voluntary saving depends on mandatory saving (via m), and hence, it is instructive to dene
critical contributing rates delimiting saving and borrowing regimes. Dene m as the contribution
rate at which voluntary saving (sm) is exactly zero, i.e. u0((1   m)wm)  Reu0(Rmwm). It
follows, sm > 0 for m < m since u
0((1   m)wm) < Reu0(Rmwm) for m < m. Next, dene
m as the contribution rate at which voluntary borrowing is exactly zero, i.e. u0((wm(1   m)) eRbu0(Rmwm), i.e. for m > m the middle-aged is borrowing. Figure 6 illustrates29 how savings
27 It arises as a special case of the three period model by setting by = y = 0 and eliminating consumption when
young from the life-time utility function.
28Note that sm > sm follows straightforwardlly in the two-period case, since 
 > e and savings are determined
by u0(wm   sm) = Ru0(Rsm) and u0(wm   sm) = Reu0(Rsm), respectively.
29For m > m; voluntary saving and old-age consumption are, of course, not, in general, linear in m.
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and old-age consumption depend on the contribution rate m. We show(
m < m sm > 0
@sm
@m
=  wm
m  m  m sm = 0 @sm@m = 0
Recall, in the absence of mandatory pension saving (m = 0), middle-aged voluntary saving
is obviously positive (sm > 0). An increase in m; at rst, crowds out voluntary saving one-to-
one leaving total-saving (= sm + mwm), and thus old-age consumption, unchanged. When m
reaches m; voluntary saving is driven to zero, and further increases in m up to m increases total-
saving and thus old age consumption one-to-one. When m reaches m; the middle-aged switch to
becoming borrowers and further increases in m induce more borrowing, and hence, falling old age
consumption (Rmwm +Rbsm).
For the optimal level of mandatory pensions savings (m) we have:
Proposition 2 (i) Life-time utility under true preferences (
) can be increased relative to laissez-
faire (m = 0) by setting a mandatory contribution rate for the middle-aged m 2 (m; m] ; and
(ii) The level of saving maximizing true life-time utility, sm, can be implemented by a mandatory
pension contribution rate m i¤ eRb > R.
The logic for the rst part of Proposition 2 follows from the discussion above. Voluntary saving
by the middle-aged is crowded out one-to-one: present-biased agents do not agree that saving should
be increased, and the returns on voluntary and mandatory savings are the same. Mandatory pension
savings becomes e¤ective only when voluntary saving is driven to the zero corner, at which point
there is no crowding out and total saving (and old age consumption) can be increased.
Can we justify a m at which the middle-aged are driven to borrow? The intuition is that
borrowing takes place at a higher rate than what saving earns, which reduces old age consumption
and true utility. The need to borrow arises due to the conict between true and choice utility.
The undoing of the mandate is governed by choice utility: the agent is attempting to counter the
forced shift of consumption, possibly from middle to old-age, by borrowing to protectmiddle-age
consumption even though it results in lower old-age consumption. This is why there is never a
welfare case for a m where the middle-aged are driven to borrow.
To see this cleanly, consider Figure 7a which lays out, as a starting point, the budget constraint
under laissez faire, cm+ coR = wm (the segment QK) with endowment point (wm; Rwm) : The agent,
since he has no old-age income, chooses point A, saving an amount D = sm: Now a small m
is introduced assuring the agent future pension wealth, Rmwm: His endowment point becomes
((1  m)wm; Rmwm) : Under this arrangement, if he borrows, his budget constraint becomes
cm +
co
Rb
= (1  m)wm + RmwmRb but stays unchanged, cm +
co
R = (1  m)wm + RmwmR = wm if
he saves; hence a kink arises at M, meaning the budget set shrinks to QMN. It is clear, for small
m, borrowing is not desirable as choosing a point on the segment MN would put the agent on a
lower indi¤erence curve (dotted red indi¤erence curve) than at A. As such, the agent continues to
choose point A, D is unchanged except sm = D  mwm falls, one for one. As m rises, all the way
18
to m; the endowment point moves leftward (his budget set shrinks to QAG). The agent continues
to choose point A, but at m; he is at a zero voluntary saving corner, sm = 0; with all saving being
mandated, D = mwm:
Figure 7a: Changing m
Note, true utility (see the atter, green indi¤erence curve) is maximized at A* on the segment
QAK. It is also apparent true utility can never be maximum except on the segment QAK. In
particular, any policy trying to get the agent close to A* cannot hope to succeed if it incentivizes
him to locate in the interior of the set QAK. If m is raised slightly beyond m to say, 
1
m; the
budget set shrinks further to QBF. Now the agent chooses point B (since A is no longer attainable),
still at the zero-saving corner. Clearly, B has less cm and more co than at point A. B is also closer
to A*, the optimal point from the standpoint of true preferences.
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Figure 7b: An over ambitious m
It is also clear why being too aggressive with raising m is a bad idea - see Figure 7b. If m
crosses m; to say, 2m; the budget set shrinks further to QVFand now the agent nds point B
more desirable than point V (on the lower, dashed red indi¤erence curve; V is at the zero-saving
corner). Furthermore, point B necessitates borrowing, leaving the agent with even less co than
before (hence, defeating the entire purpose of the mandated scheme!) Notice, how the agent is
taken further away from A* with such strong a mandate: true utility would have been higher if
point V could be chosen.
The second part of Proposition 2 shows, it is possible to implement the optimal level of savings
sm (one maximizing true life-time utility 
) i¤ eRb > R or RbR > e . Intuitively, any m 2
(m; m] can be implemented; since agents are driven to the zero-saving corner in this range, any
such m also delivers higher utility than under laissez-faire. Indeed, the m consistent with optimal
saving (sm) must also lie in this interval. The gap between the level of laissez-faire and optimal
saving is clearly larger, the larger the ratio of the subjective discount rates, 
e . The zero-saving
interval is wider, the bigger the ratio RbR . Hence, the condition
eRb > R essentially renders
the zero-saving interval wide enough to place sm in the interior.
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Figure 7c: Importance of gap between R and Rb
Proposition 2 also shows that present-biased preferences are necessary but not su¢ cient to derive
a welfare case for mandatory pensions. The capital market imperfection is also crucial. Consider
Figure 7c where the budget set under perfect capital markets is QA*K and the agent chooses point
A. If there is a small gap between R and Rb, the budget set becomes QA*K1 causing the agent
to move to W. However, if the market imperfection is su¢ ciently strong, the relevant budget set
would be, say, QA*K2; in which case, the agent would choose point A*  in this case, the true
optimal saving level can be implemented. Increasing Rb for a given R increases the interval where
the zero corner arises thereby creating a welfare case for mandatory pensions. In the limit, letting
Rb !1 (no borrowing allowed, as in most of the literature discussed in the introduction) eliminates
borrowing, and as such, old-age consumption is monotonically increasing in the contribution rate
(above m). In that case, the optimal saving level can always be implemented.
The above discussion makes clear that it matters to what extent agents can undo the man-
dates on pension saving by borrowing. Our assumption, Rb > R; restricts but does not eliminate
such undoing. One may think of alternative restrictions on the ability to borrow against future
pension wealth. Qualitatively, all such restrictions would e¤ectively yield the same sort of implica-
tion, producing a zero-saving corner which, again, would prevent the agent from fully undoing the
mandate.30
Our nding that there is never a welfare case for policy mandates compelling the middle-aged
to borrow suggests the answer to the title of the paper should be, no. The answer to the question,
30 If in addition to the return di¤erence, is imposed an upper limit limit on borrowing, one that is dependent on
pension wealth, there will be two potential corners, the usual zero-savings corner, and a new one where borrowing is
at the maximum allowed level. Even in that case, our central insight that a welfare case for mandated pensions on
the middle-aged appears once they are at the zero-saving corner, will continue to hold.
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it turns out, is not that simple, for reasons developed in the next section.
5 Mandatory pension contributions
Could there ever be a welfare case for mandating the young to save when they are simultaneously
borrowing, that too, at a higher rate? Since most mandated pension schemes have age-independent
contribution rates, there is the additional question of whether such age-constrained schemes can
improve welfare.
Any welfare case for mandated pensions must rest on voluntary saving for old age being too low
see Proposition 1. In the two-period model of Section 4, we show it is always possible to increase
true life-time utility by mandating contributions for the middle-aged. Also, such mandates work
only when voluntary saving is pinned to the zero corner with no possibility of crowding out. By
contrast, in a three-period model, saving decisions are made both as young and middle-aged, and
as demonstrated above c.f. (8) the lower the borrowing as young, the smaller is the borrowing
as middle-aged. If the government could restrict borrowing by the young, it could solve their
overborrowing problem and be left to contend with the undersaving problem of the middle-aged.
This imperative, however, has to be balanced against the consideration that the young are natural
borrowers and do not like the borrowing restriction.31
To see this more clearly, for the moment set y = 0 and focus on the imposition of m: What
governs the choice of such a m? Recall, if the middle-aged have positive voluntary savings, an
increase in m is o¤set one-for-one by a decline in voluntary saving thereby keeping total saving,
and hence true utility, unchanged. Once m has been raised su¢ ciently, voluntary saving is driven
to the zero corner, and from there on, crowding out is absent and any further increases in m
raises total saving via increases in the mandated part. This increase in total saving helps true
utility. What might mandating some contribution from the young do? Since the middle-aged are
at the zero voluntary savings corner, ceteris paribus, an increase in future pension wealth induces
the young to borrow more. Under our assumptions, the middle-aged remain pinned at the zero
voluntary saving corner while total saving for old age rises. The higher borrowing by the young,
that too at the higher rate (Rb), hurts true utility but that is counterbalanced by the gain in true
utility resulting from higher total saving. Mandating saving on the middle-aged would provide
them much-needed commitment but should the young be left alone or co-opted into this? This
tension is the subject matter of the rest of the paper.
To set the scene, consider the e¤ect on welfare from changing the pension contribution rates for
the young and the middle-aged. Continue to focus on a case with by > 0 and sm > 0: True utility
31This sort of simultaneous borrowing and saving, although in very di¤erent contexts but for similar underlying
reasons, is also centerstage in Murdoch (2010) and Basu (2016). In Murdoch (2010), for example, it may be desirable
for families to borrow even when they have enough savings, just because it is easier to repay a moneylender than to
repayoneself.
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using (1) and substituting in consumption levels in terms of by and sm is

 = u (wy(1  y) + by)+u (wm(1  m) Rbby   sm)+()2 u
 
Rsm +R
2ywy +Rmwm)

:
(12)
It follows that
@

@y
=  u0(cy)

wy +
@by
@y

+ u0(cm)

Rb
@by
@y
  @sm
@y

+ ()2 u0(co)

R
@sm
@y
+R2wy

;
@

@m
=  u0(cy) @by
@y
+ u0(cm)

 wm +Rb @by
@y
  @sm
@m

+ ()2 u0(co)

R
@sm
@m
+Rwm

:
Using  u0 (cy)+su0 (co) = 0 see (11) where s  eR h   e@D(by)@by +Rbei and u0 (cm) =eRu0 (co), we can derive
@

@y
=

()2R2   s

wy   @by
@y

+ R
eRb   R @by
@y
+ R

   e @sm
@y

u0(co);(13)
@

@m
=

R

   ewm + @sm
@m

+

ReRb   s @by
@m

u0(co): (14)
The term wy   @by@y comprises of two parts: the part wy adds to pension wealth when old; the
part   @by@y captures the e¤ect of a change in the youngs contribution rate on the starting wealth
of the middle-aged. The term wm + @sm@m captures the e¤ect of a change in the middle-ageds
contribution rate on pension wealth of the old. These terms capture the direct budget e¤ects of the
contribution rates. In addition, there are indirect e¤ects arising from the interaction between the
saving decisions of the young and middle-aged captured in s. For example, a higher y induces the
middle-aged to save less (@sm@y < 0) which hurts true welfare since the middle-aged were undersaving
(   e > 0) to begin with. Similarly, for the other indirect e¤ects.
It is di¢ cult to derive analytical results on the optimal combination of y and m maximizing
social welfare satisfying (13)-(14). Part of the reason for this di¢ culty is the presence of the term,
s; which, at this level of generality, is a function of y and m: Below, we make the assumption
that u is homothetic, in which case, s becomes independent of the contribution rates. In that
case, we are able to pursue two manageable questions of great policy signicance. First, is there
ever a welfare case for imposing mandatory pension contributions on young borrowers (y > 0)
if the middle-aged are already mandated (optimally) to save for pensions, m > 0? Put another
way, could it be optimal to impose a y > 0, rather than setting a higher m ? If the answer
is a¢ rmative, it establishes that the optimal policy has both y > 0 and m > 0 (in general
y 6= m). Second, assuming the contribution rate cannot be made age-dependent (i.e., it must be
that y = m =  must hold), is there a welfare case for introducing a mandatory pension scheme
( > 0)? If the answer is a¢ rmative, it would imply that the possible net costs from mandating the
young to contribute the same as the middle-aged do not dominate the overall welfare gains made
by mandatory pensions savings. In either case, the young will, both, save for pensions and borrow.
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5.1 Should the young be mandated to save for pensions?
We pursue this research question in the following way. Consider a situation where there is only an
optimal mandated contribution requirement on the middle-aged (age-dependent contribution rates
are m > 0; y = 0). We show in Appendix F that the middle-aged voluntarily save for m < am,
and are at the zero saving corner for am < m. As outlined above, we assume henceforth
Assumption u is homothetic.
Under this assumption, it can be checked D (by) = 

R; e [wm  Rbby +Rywy] implying
@D(by)
@by
=  

R; eRb and hence, s = eR h   e@D(by)@by +Rbei is independent of y and
m:
Proposition 3 (i) If only the middle-aged contribute to the pension scheme (y = 0), there exists
a contribution rate m 2 [am; am] such that middle-aged have zero voluntary savings but total old-
age saving is increased and true utility is higher than under laissez-faire.
(ii) When the middle-aged are at a corner with zero voluntary savings, true utility can be improved
by a positive mandated contribution rate for the young, i.e. @


@y
jy=0 > 0 for am < m < am under
the su¢ cient condition that 
e > R2bR2 ;
(iii) The optimal allocation (by; sm) cannot be implemented by a choice of (y; m) for Rb > R:
The rst part of Proposition 3 is a straightforward generalization of Proposition 2 from the
two-period case. A contribution rate below am < 0 is ine¤ective in raising total saving, since there
is complete crowding out. Choosing a m > am drives voluntary saving by the middle-aged to
the zero corner, and mandated saving raises total savings, and this improves true utility. Setting
m > 
a
m is not optimal since it drives the middle-aged to borrow and old-age consumption to fall
(see Lemma 2).
The second part of Proposition 3 is more interesting. It nds, in a setting with zero, voluntary
middle-age saving (meaning any saving is mandated), welfare may be raised by mandating contri-
butions by the young as well. This makes intuitive sense: the middle-aged are already at a corner
and requiring the young to save unambiguously increases saving for old age which is desirable due
to its sobering e¤ect on the undersaving problem. Of course, mandating the young reduces their
consumption, also desirable from a welfare perspective, except it leads them to borrow more (at
a rate exceeding that on saving). That curtails middle-age consumption. Therefore, a trade-o¤
arises between the gain from increasing old-age consumption and the cost in terms of borrowing. A
su¢ cient condition for imposing welfare-enhancing mandatory saving requirements on the young is
e > R2bR2 , i.e., the present bias in preferences should be su¢ ciently strong compared to the return
di¤erence.
Why is mandating the young to save conceptually di¤erent from mandating the middle-aged?
Mandating the young to save for pensions increases old-age consumption (with the middle-aged at
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the zero corner), and that may increase welfare. But requiring the middle-aged to save for pensions
may cause them to borrow which, unambiguously, reduces old-age consumption and, hence, defeats
the purpose for the mandates.
The nal part of Proposition 3 argues that a pre-committed choice of (y; m) cannot simul-
taneously correct the overborrowing problem of the young and the undersaving problem of the
middle-aged. Mandated saving policies can help reduce the severity of the latter, as we have seen,
but the overborrowing problem is made worse by the gap between Rb and R: Broadly speaking,
which is more crucial, helping with the undersaving problem of the middle-aged or the overbor-
rowing problem of the young? Two issues arise here. First, standard discounting would suggest
over/under errorsmatter more when the agent has one period left versus when he has two. But
counter to that logic is the notion that borrowing errors face a higher opportunity cost since
Rb > R:
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5.2 Age-independent contribution rates
Impose, further, the restriction that  = y = m, that is, the contribution rate has to be age-
independent. Is there a welfare case for introducing mandatory pensions savings under this restric-
tion? This restriction makes the task at hand harder. On the other hand, if a welfare case exists
even under this restriction, it is a strong validation for imposing mandates on the young.
In line with above, we have that the middle-aged have positive saving if  <  , negative savings
for  >  and are at the corner with zero savings for      ; c.f. Appendix F. Note evaluating

 for  = 0 implies the starting position is one where the middle-aged are savers ( < ). We
have
Proposition 4 (i) Life-time utility is decreasing in the age-independent contribution rate, when
the middle aged are savers
@

@
< 0 for  < 
(ii) Increasing the age-independent contribution rate increases life-time utility when the middle-aged
are at the corner
@

@

=
> 0
under the su¢ cient condition that R > eRb.
The result is proved in Appendix F. Following previous insights we nd that a potential welfare
case for mandatory pension saving arises when the middle-aged are at the zero corner. However,
32Guo and Caliendo (2014) argue that a time-inconsistent mandated saving policy, one which deviates from the
stated (y; m) and misleads the middle-aged as to their required contribution rate, may deliver the optimal
(by; s

m).
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this is not automatic for two reasons. First, even when the middle-aged are at the zero-saving
corner, welfare is not necessarily increasing in the contribution rate. A su¢ cient condition for this
to be the case is that 
e > RbR , i.e. the present bias should be su¢ cient strong relative to the return
di¤erences. Second, even if this condition holds, a welfare case for a positive contribution rate has
not been made; after all, welfare is decreasing in the contribution rate when the middle-aged have
positive saving because a higher contribution rate does not raise old-age consumption as the saving
of both the young and the middle-aged are crowded out. A welfare case for a positive contribution
rate thus requires a  2 ( ;  ] such that

( = 0) < 
() for  <    (15)
Clearly, it is, in general, an open question whether the condition (15) is fullled.
The log-utility case (see Eqs. (20)-(21) in Appendix D which hold for by > 0 and sm > 0) can
be used to illustrate the e¤ects of an age-independent contribution rate. Figure 8 shows how true
life-time utility depends on the age-independent contribution rate. Starting from zero, increasing
the contribution rate decreases welfare. This is the case as long as voluntary savings by the middle-
aged is positive. Upon reaching a contribution rate where the middle-aged are at the zero savings
corner, welfare starts increasing. Note, for the particular case shown, welfare is higher with a
positive contribution rate, i.e. condition (15) holds.
Figure 8: True utility against 
6 Concluding remarks
The standard life-cycle pattern of consumption and saving is that the young borrow and the middle-
aged are net-savers. Present-biased preferences imply the young borrow too much, and the middle-
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aged save too little compared to the optimal choices under the true preferences of the young. This
provides an argument for mandatory pension savings, not only for the middle-aged but also for the
young. This holds even if the contribution rate is constrained to be age-independent. We show why
present-bias is necessary but not su¢ cient to rationalize mandated saving; the extent of the credit
market imperfection is crucial. Moreover, we show that the welfare case for mandated pension
savings does not rely on the specic source (myopia or hyperbolic discounting) of present-biased
preferences. This is reassuring from a policy perspective, since it can be di¢ cult to empirically
distinguish between the two.
Are pension mandates Pareto-improving? Consider the notion of Pareto e¢ ciency dened on
multiple selves discussed in Luttmer and Mariotti (2007). There, an allocation is Pareto ine¢ cient
if there exists another feasible allocation which makes at least one self better o¤ and no self worse
o¤. In our setting, consider as a starting point, the allocation call it laissez faire chosen by a
sophisticated myopic Self 1. (No feasible allocation, of course, can improve upon the choice utility
of the naive Self 1). Our results show, another allocation, one involving mandatory contribution
rates on both the young and the middle-aged, improves on laissez faire true utility of Self 1. What
about Self 2? Self 2 clearly benets from the commitment value of mandatory saving but it is also
true that, under mandatory pensions, his consumption is lowered (even though his future self, Self
3 has higher consumption and is happier). On net, it is not obvious whether Self 2 is necessarily
happier than under laissez faire. In short, it is not obvious whether pension mandates constitute a
Pareto improvement.
How would our results change if we allowed for endogenous factor prices? Suppose we allowed
for neoclassical production using capital (and labor) as inputs so that under competitive markets,
the wage rate and the interest rate on saving depended, in a standard way, on the capital-labor ratio
as in a Diamond model. In such a setting, a higher contribution rate imposed on the middle-aged
would reduce their voluntary saving, one for one, while their pension funds hold proportionately
more capital, leaving aggregate capital unchanged.33 Again, as above, once the middle-aged are
driven to a zero voluntary saving corner, aggregate capital (held entirely by the pension funds)
can go up, raising wages but lowering interest rates. These last two general-equilibrium e¤ects will
complicate matters by changing the size of the pension itself, and so on. The central insight, that
the middle-aged have to be driven to the corner for mandatory pensions to work, is untouched,
though.
Our ndings suggest optimal contribution rates are age-dependent, somewhat counter to what
is observed. Our model is sparse, for one. Besides practical and administrative reasons, there is the
argument that the life-cycle pattern for earnings will not be the same for all, and therefore a simple
age-dependent system will not be able to capture individual heterogeneities. For this reason an
important issue for future research is the implications of heterogeneity not only across the earnings
33This was not the case in Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) where the alternative to private saving was return-
dominated unfunded social security. As such, as private capital got crowded out, its return rose, thereby preventing
agents from hitting the zero-capital corner. There too, su¢ cient myopia was needed to get a welfare role for PAYG
pensions.
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dimension but also with respect to preferences. How should mandatory pension systems be designed
if the degree of present-bias is di¤erent across the population (including that some may not su¤er
from present bias). On a technical level, the latter may also be used to argue that discontinuities
in saving at the individual level the zero corner may disappear at the aggregate level.
Finally, balance expansion  the simultaneous expansion of the asset (in our case, pension
wealth) and liability side (say, household debt) of a balance sheet may also have consequences for
macroeconomic stability because assets and liabilities have di¤erent maturity structures, pension
assets being highly illiquid, and available only after retirement and household debt is highly liquid
and subject to recall see Andre (2016). This angle is also worthy of separate inquiry.
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Appendix
A Young-Naive
The sophisticated young realize that they will "change" preferences, the naive do not. Hence,
in the case of the naive young we have to distinguish between planned savings as middle-aged
(spm) inuencing the savings decision as young, and the actual savings as middle-aged (sam). The
di¤erence between spm and sam arises from the preference-reversal which the naive does not take into
account.
Life-time utility as perceived when young reads
u ((1  y)wy + by) + e u ((1  m)wm  Rbby   spm) + u  R2ywy +Rmwm +Rspm
Hence, the naive expects savings as middle-aged to be determined by (the superscript p refers to
planned, which will di¤er from actual)
 u0 ((1  m)wm  Rbby   spm) + Ru0
 
R2ywy +Rmwm +Rs
p
m

= 0 if spm > 0 (16)
 u0 ((1  m)wm  Rbby   spm) + Rbu0
 
R2ywy +Rmwm +Rbs
p
m

= 0 if spm < 0 (17)
Hence, the corner condition for middle-aged savings read:
Rbu
0  R2ywy +Rmwm > u0 ((1  m)wm +Rbsy) > Ru0  R2ywy +Rmwm (18)
or
Rbu
0  cpo jspm=0 > u0  cpm jspm=0 > Ru0  cpo jspm=0
It follows
@spm
@by
=
8>>><>>>:
  Rbu
00(cpm)
u00(cpm)+R2u00(cpo)
< 0 for u0
 
cpm jspm=0

< Ru0
 
cpo jspm=0

0 for Rbu0
 
cpo jspm=0

> u0
 
cpm jspm=0

> Ru0
 
cpo jspm=0

  Rbu
00(cpm)
u00(cpm)+R2bu00(c
p
o)
> 0 for Rbu0
 
cpo jspm=0

< u0
 
cpm jspm=0

and
@spm
@m
=
8><>:
 wm for u0
 
cpm jspm=0

< Ru0
 
cpo jspm=0

0 for Rbu0
 
cpo jspm=0

> u0
 
cpm jspm=0

> Ru0
 
cpo jspm=0

>  wm for Rbu0
 
cpo jspm=0

< u0
 
cpm jspm=0

The optimal savings decision as young is given as (notice that the envelope theorem applies in
this case)
u0 ((1  y)wy + by)  eRbu0 ((1  m)wm  Rbby   spm) = 0
It is still the case, that savings is below the level chosen under the true preferences. Finally, actual
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savings by the middle-aged is determined by
 u0 ((1  m)wm  Rbby   sam) + Ru0
 
R2ywy +Rmwm +Rs
a
m

= 0 if sam > 0
 u0 ((1  m)wm  Rbby   sam) + Rbu0
 
R2ywy +Rmwm +Rbs
a
m

= 0 if sam < 0
Note that the "corner" condition (18) is unchanged since it depends on by which is pre-determined.
It is now straightforward to show the main results of the paper carries over. First, assume
y = 0, then
@sy
@m
= 0;
@sam
@m
=  wm for m < nm
and hence @


@m
= 0 for m < nm. If the middle-aged are at the corner we have
@

@m
= u0(cy)
@by
@m
  u0(cm)Rb @by
@m
+ ()2 u0(co)Rwm
=
he   iRbu0(cm) @by
@m
+ ()2 u0(co)Rwm > 0
since @by@m < 0 for m < 
n
m. Hence, for y = 0 there is a m > 
n
m which increases welfare above
laissez-faire. Suppose nm < 

m < 
n
m, is there a welfare case for y > 0? We have
@

@y
= u0(cy)

 wy + @by
@y

  u0(cm)Rb @by
@y
+ ()2 u0(co)R2wy Q 0 for nm < m < 
n
m
which is basically the same condition as in the case with sophisticated young.
B Borrowing by the young
The savings decision of the middle-aged (sm) depends on borrowing as young (by), and this is
perceived by the (sophisticated) young. Hence, the two decisions are interconnected. The main
text works with the case where agents in the absence of mandatory pension savings are borrowers
as young (by > 0) and savers as middle-aged (sm > 0), since this is the case where the welfare
rationale for mandatory savings (especially for the young) may be called into question. If the
young are savers, there is no essential di¤erence between being young and middle-aged and thus
between the two- and three-period model.
In the absence of mandatory savings, it is trivial that the middle-aged are saving (sm > 0) since
this is the only way of ensuring consumption when old. From the main text we have that
@

@by
= u0 (cy) + e h   eiRu0 (co) @sm
@by
  eRbu0 (cm)
If @
@by jby=0> 0 it follows that by > 0 which in turn requires
u0 (wy) > eRbu0 (wm   sm)  e h   eiRu0 (Rsm) @sm
@by
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or using that eRu0 (Rsm) = u0 (wm   sm)
u0 (wy) > u0 (wm   sm)
eRb   h   ei @sm
@by

Note that eRb   h   ei @sm@by < Rb since @sm@by >  Rb. A su¢ cient condition ensuring by > 0 is
thus
u0 (wy) > u0 (wm   sm)Rb (19)
where sm is determined from: u0 (wm   sm) = Reu0 (Rsm), hence 0 < sm < wm. Hence, condition
(19) holds if the wage as young is not too high, i.e.
wy  wy(wm; ; e;R;Rb)
C Overborrowing by the young and undersaving by the middle-
aged
This appendix proves that in the absence of any pension system agents "overborrow" when young
(by > by) and "undersave" when middle-aged (sm < sm) in the absence of any pension scheme (y =
m = 0). The savings decision of the middle-aged is thus determined by:  u0 (wm  Rbby   sm) +eRu0 (Rsm) = 0 and since u0 (Rsm)!1 for sm ! 0, it follows that sm > 0. Intuitively, the only
way by which the individual can ensure consumption as old is by saving as middle-aged. Under the
true preferences we have that savings is determined by  u0  wm  Rbby   sm+ Ru0 (Rsm) = 0.
The savings as middle-aged depends on borrowing as young and we have sm =  (by); sm =  
(by).
Notice, that  (b) <  (b) since eR < R, and both function are decreasing in their argument.
The rst order condition for the borrowing decision by the young (11)
 u0 (cy) + eR    e@D (by)
@by

+Rbeu0 (co) = 0
can by use of u0(cm) = eRu0 (co) be written
 u0 (wy + by) +

   e@D (by)
@by

+Rbeu0 (wm  Rbby    (by)) = 0;
denote the solution bcy.
For the true preferences we have that life-time utility depends on borrowing as young as
@

@by
= u0
 
wy + b

y
  Rbu0  wm  Rbby    (sy)
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Evaluate this derivative, for the borrowing decision of the young under the choice preferences bcy
@

@by
j bcy = u0 (wy + by)  Rbu0 (wm  Rbby    (by))
=

   e@D (by)
@by

+Rbeu0 (wm  Rbby    (by))  Rbu0 (wm  Rbby    (by)) < 0
where the inequality follows by noting that (recall

   e@D(by)@by +Rbe < Rb)
Rb >

   e@D (by)
@by

+Rbe
u0 (wm  Rbby   f(by)) < u0 (wm  Rbby    (by)) since  (by) >  (by)
It follows by < by and, therefore, by implication sm > sm.
D The separate role of  and 
For future use in determining a welfare case for mandated saving, it is important to understand
how saving by the di¤erent selves depend on the source of the present bias, i.e., the separate role
of myopia (  ) and quasi-hyperbolic discounting ( < 1). It is easiest to see this in the context
of a concrete example.
Log utility: If the utility function is u(ci) = ln ci for i = y;m; o; then assuming by > 0 and
sm > 0, it can be checked that
by =   1
1 + 1e(1+)
"(
1  y
 
1 +
1e (1 + ) RRb
!)
wy   1eRb (1 + )wm
#
; (20)
sm =
1
1 + 1e(1+)
1
1 + e
"(e   m e + 1e 1 + e1 +  + 1
!)
wm +
(eRb   y
 eRb +R 1e 1 + e1 +  +R
!)
wy
#
(21)
To see the role of quasi-hyperbolic discounting ( < 1 =)  < e); consider a decrease in ; which,
for given e, corresponds to an increase in . It follows straightforwardly that
@by
@
e < 0; @sm@
e > 0
i.e., hyperbolic discounting tends to decrease borrowing as young and raise saving as middle-aged.
The intuition is, the sophisticated young perceives her middle-aged self will be present-biased and
therefore saves too little. By decreasing borrowing when young, starting wealth as middle-aged
increases, which in turn incentivizes the middle-aged to save more. Reduced borrowing (or increased
saving) as young thus works as a commitment device which helps with the time inconsistency but
not enough to remove the undersaving issue discussed above. Also note, the magnitude of these
responses do depend on the contribution rates.
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E Two period model
Dene m as the contribution rate at which voluntary savings for the middle-aged is exactly zero,
i.e.
u0((1  m)wm) = Reu0(Rmwm)
it follows that sm > 0 for m < m since u
0((1  m)wm) < Reu0(Rmwm) for m < m.
Similarly, dene m as the contribution rate at which voluntary borrowing is exactly zero, i.e.
u0((wm(1  m)) = eRbu0(Rmwm)
i.e.for m > m individuals will borrow since u0((wm(1  m)) > eRbu0(Rmwm) for m > m.
For m < m we have
@

@m
jsm>0=  u0(cm)

wm +
@sm
@m
jsm>0

+ u0(co)

wm +
@sm
@m
jsm>0

R
and hence using that wm + @sm@m jsm>0= 0 it follows that
@

@m
jsm>0= 0 for m < m
For m  m  m (implying sm = 0) we have
@

@m
jsm=0=  u0(cm)wm + u0(co)wmR
and hence evaluated for m = m
@

@m
jsm=0;m=
h
   eiu0(co)wmR > 0
This proves that there exists a contribution rate for the middle-aged m > m > 0 which delivers
higher welfare than in the absence of mandatory pensions savings.
Finally, consider the case m > m, i.e. the contribution rate is so high that the middle-aged
become borrowers (sm < 0) the situation is more complicated since private voluntary savings is no
longer zero but negative. Increasing the contribution rate thus makes the middle-aged borrow, and
it is not clear that welfare in net terms can be increased. We have
@

@m
jsm<0=  u0(cm)

wm +
@sm
@m
jsm<0

+ u0(co)

wmR+Rb
@sm
@m
jsm<0

< 0
which follows from noting that we have shown that wm+ @sm@m jsm<0> 0 and wmR+Rb @sm@m jsm<0< 0.
In short, welfare can never be improved by choosing a contribution rate implying that the middle-
aged borrow to undo part of the mandatory pension saving.
To consider the implementation of the rst best, i.e. the savings level under the true preferences
sm, dene
m 
sm
wm
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i.e. the contribution rate m implements the optimal savings level sm, if voluntary savings is
zero. Since net saving is una¤ected by mandatory pension savings for m < m , it follows from
sm > sm(m = 0) that m > m. For m  m  m households will be at the corner, neither
voluntary savings nor borrowing. This is the case if
eRb > u0(wm(1  m))
u0(Rwmm)
> eR
Recall (mwm = sm) optimal savings is given by
u0(wm   sm)
u0(Rsm)
= R
Hence m  m  m i¤
eRb > R > eR
The last inequality holds always, and the rst requires 
e < RbR .
F Appendix: Age dependent contribution rates
The following considers whether the young should be mandated to contribute to pension savings,
when there is mandatory pension contributions for the middle-aged (m). To this end we rst
need to establish that it is optimal to make the middle-aged contribute, and next consider whether
the young should also be asked to contribute. Similar to above, dene am and 
a
m as the critical
contribution rates which delineates the positive savings, savings corner and negative savings for the
middle-aged, i.e.
am : u
0 ((1  am)wm  Rbby) = eRu0 (Ramwm)
am : u
0 ((1  am)wm  Rbby) = eRbu0 (Ramwm)
Case I: Middle-aged are saving (sm > 0)
When the middle-aged are savers (sm > 0) we have that savings (by; sm) for y = 0,m > 0 are
determined by
u0 (wy + by) = eR    e@D (by)
@by

+Rbeu0 (Rsm +Rmwm)
u0 (wm  Rbby   mwm   sm) = eRu0 (Rsm +Rmwm)
This system determines borrowing as young by and total savings as middled-aged D  sm+ mwm,
hence @sm@m =  wm as long as the condition sm > 0 holds, and therefore
@(sm+mwm)
@m
= 0 which in
turn implies that @by@m = 0.
Case II: Middle-aged at the corner (sm = 0)
For am  m  am; sm = 0 and a change in the contribution rate for the middle-aged a¤ect
true life-time utility as
@

@m
jsm=0=  u0(cm)wm + u0(co)wmR
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where cm and co and the outcomes under the choice preferences. Assessing the marginal welfare
e¤ect for m = am using that u
0(cm) = Reu0(co)we nd
@

@m
jsm=0;m=m=

   eu0(co)wmR > 0
i.e., true welfare can be improved by setting a contribution rate m > am.
Case III: Middle-aged as borrowers (sm < 0)
Assume that m > am in this case the middle-aged are borrowers. The life-time utility as
perceived when young reads
u ((1  y)wy + by) + e [u ((1  m)wm  Rbby   sm) + u (b+Rbsm)]
and the rst-order condition reads
u0 (cy) + e  u0 (cm) + Rbu0 (co) @sm
@by
jsm<0  eRbu0 (cm) = 0
by use of u0 (cm) = eRbu0 (co) it can be written
u0 (cy) = bu0 (co)
where
b 
e    @sm
@by
jsm<0 +eRbRbe
Note that
@sm
@sy
jsm<0=  
Rbu
00 (cm)
u00 (cm) + eR2bu00 (co)
implying that @sm@by >  Rb; and hence it follows that 0 < b < RbRbe. With homothetic prefer-
ences b is independent of cm and co.
Writing the rst order condition for the borrowing and savings decisions we have
u0 ((1  y)wy + by) = bu0
 
R2ywy +Rmwm +Rbsm

u0 ((1  m)wm  Rbby   sm) = eRbu0  R2ywy +Rmwm +Rbsm
Di¤erentiating wrt y yields
u00 (cy)

 wy + @by
@y

= bu
00 (co)

R2wy +Rb
@sm
@y

u00 (cm)

 Rb @by
@y
  @sm
@y

= eRbu00 (co) R2wy +Rb@sm
@y

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and wrt m
u00 (cy)

@by
@m

= bu
00 (co)

Rwm +Rb
@sm
@m

u00 (cm)

 wm  Rb @by
@m
  @sm
@m

= eRbu00 (co) Rwm +Rb @sm
@m

Writing this in matrix form we have"
u00 (cy)  bu00 (co)Rb
 u00 (cm)Rb  
h
u00 (cm) + eR2bu00 (co)i
# "
@by
@m
@sm
@m
#
=
"
bu
00 (co)RwmeRbu00 (co)Rwm + u00 (cm)wm
#
implying
@by
@m
=
 bu00 (co)Rwm  bu00 (co)RbeRbu00 (co)Rwm + u00 (cm)wm   hu00 (cm) + eR2bu00 (co)i
 u00 (cy)  bu00 (co)Rb u00 (cm)Rb   hu00 (cm) + eR2bu00 (co)i

< 0
It follows from the expressions above
sign

 wm  Rb @by
@m
  @sm
@m

= sign

Rwm +Rb
@sm
@m

sign

@by
@m

= sign

 wm  Rb @by
@m
  @sm
@m

Since @by@m < 0 it follows that  wm  Rb
@by
@m
  @sm@m < 0 and wmR+Rb @sm@m < 0. Next note that
@

@m
=

b
@by
@m
  eRb wm +Rb @by
@m
+
@sm
@m

+ ()2

wmR+Rb
@sm
@m

u0(co)
and hence @


@m
< 0 for m > am. This proves that the optimal m 2 [am; am].
Pension contributions by the young
Assume that the optimal m 2 [am; am] :Can welfare be improved by setting a y > 0? We have
(recall sm = 0)
@

@y
=  u0(cy)

wy   @by
@y

  u0(cm)Rb @by
@y
+ ()2 u0(co)R2wy for am  m  am
or
@

@y
=  u0(cy)wy  

u0(cm)Rb   u0(cy)
 @by
@y
+ ()2 u0(co)R2wy
Since u0(cy) = eRbu0(cm) it follows that
u0(cm)Rb   u0(cy) =
h
   eiRbu0(cm) > 0
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and therefore
@

@y
>  u0(cy)wy  

u0(cm)Rb   u0(cy)

wy + (
)2 u0(co)R2wy
since @by@y < wy. Hence a su¢ cient condition that
@

@y
> 0 is
 u0(cy)wy  

u0(cm)Rb   u0(cy)

wy + (
)2 u0(co)R2wy > 0
or
wy

u0(co)R2   u0(cm)Rb

> 0
This inequality holds if
u0(co)R2 > u0(cm)Rb
or
R2
Rb
u0(co) > u0(cm)
R2eRbRbu0(co)eRb > u0(cm)
For the middled-aged to at the zero savings corner we require
u0(co)eRb > u0(cm) > eRu0(co)
and hence a su¢ cient condition that @


@y
> 0 is
R2eRbRb > 1
or
R2 > eR2b
Implementing (by; sm)
Is it possible to implement the optimal choice under the true preferences (by; sm) and the
associated consumption levels (cy; cm; co) by some choice of y and m. To address this quesstion
rst write the consumption levels for the optimal choices under the true preferences, i.e.
cy = wy + b

y
cm = wm  Rbby   sm
co = Rs

m
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and under the choice preference for given values of y and m.
cy = (1  y)wy + by
cm = (1  m)wm  Rbby   sm
co = R
2ywy +Rmwm +Rsm
For cy = cy we require
wy + b

y = (1  y)wy + by
or
by   by = ywy (22)
For cm = cm we require
wm  Rbby   sm = (1  m)wm  Rbby   sm
or
sm   sm =  mwm  Rb
 
by   by

(23)
Finally, for co = co we require
Rsm = R
2ywy +Rmwm +Rsm
or
sm   sm =   (Rywy + mwm) (24)
Combining (23) and (24) gives
  (Rywy + mwm) =  mwm  Rb
 
by   by

or
 Rywy = Rb
 
sy   sy

and using (22) this requires
 Rywy =  Rbywy
or R = Rb, showing that it is not possible to implement (by; sm) and the associated consumption
levels (cy; cm; co) by some choice of y and m.
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G Age independent contribution rates
When the middle-aged are savers, savings decisions are determined by
u0 ((1  )wy + by) = su0
 
Rsm +R
2wy +Rwm

u0 ((1  )wm  Rbby   sm) = eRu0  Rsm +R2wy +Rwm
where
s  eR    e@D (by)
@by

+Rbe
Note that 0 < s < RRbe and s is indendent of by and sm under homothetic preferences.
Hence, di¤erentiating the foc condtions above wrt  we get
u00 (cy)

 wy + @by
@

= su
00 (co)

R
@sm
@
+R2wy +Rwm

u00 (cm)

 wm  Rb@by
@
  @sm
@

= eRu00 (co) R@sm
@
+R2wy +Rwm

implying
sign

wy   @by
@

=  sign

R
@sm
@
+R2wy +Rwm

sign

 wm  Rb@by
@
  @sm
@

= sign

R
@sm
@
+R2wy +Rwm

To solve for @sy@ and
@sm
@ the above expression can be written in matrix form as"
u00 (cy)  su00 (co)R
 u00 (cm)Rb  
h
u00 (cm) + eR2u00 (co)i
# "
@by
@
@sm
@
#
=
"
u00 (cy)wy + su00 (co)

R2wy +Rwm

u00 (cm)wm + eRu00 (co) R2wy +Rwm
#
which implies that
@by
@
=
 u00 (cy)wy + su00 (co)

R2wy +Rwm
  su00 (co)R
u00 (cm)wm + eRu00 (co) R2wy +Rwm   hu00 (cm) + eR2u00 (co)i
 u00 (cy)  su00 (co)R u00 (cm)Rb   hu00 (cm) + eR2u00 (co)i

implying
@by
@
=

u00 (cy) + su00 (co)R2

u00 (cm)
u00 (cy)
h
u00 (cm) + eR2u00 (co)i+ su00 (co)Ru00 (cm)Rbwy < wy
From this it can be inferred by use of the above sign-relations: wy   @by@ > 0;wm +Rb @by@ + @sm@ >
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0;R@sm@ +R
2wy +Rwm < 0. Considering the welfare e¤ects from a change in  we have
@

@
=  u0(cy)

wy   @by
@

 u0(cm)

wm +Rb
@Sy
@
+
@Sm
@

+()2 u0(co)

R
@Sm
@
+R2wy +Rwm

< 0
and it follows that @


@ < 0 for  <  .
Consider next  2 [ ;  ] where the middle-aged are at a corner. In this case savings as young is
determined by
u0 ((1  )wy + by) = eRbu0 ((1  )wm  Rbby)
and the corner condition reads
u0(R2wy +Rwm)eRb > u0((1  )wm  Rbby) > eRu0(R2wy +Rwm)
It follows straightforwardly that
@by
@
=
u00 (cy)wy + eRbu00 (cm)wm
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm)
Note for later that
wy   @by
@
=
u00 (cy)wy + eR2bu00 (cm)wy   u00 (cy)wy   eRbu00 (cm)wm
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm)
=
eR2bu00 (cm)wy   eRbu00 (cm)wm
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm)
For  2 [ ;  ] and thus sm = 0 we have that welfare is a¤ected by a change in the contribution
rate as:
@

@
=  u0(cy)

wy   @by
@

  u0(cm)

wm +Rb
@by
@

+ ()2 u0(co)

R2wy +Rwm

=

 eRb wy   @by
@

  

wm +Rb
@sy
@

u0(cm) + ()2 u0(co)

R2wy +Rwm

=

 eRbwy   wm   hRb   eRbi @sy
@

u0(cm) + ()2 u0(co)

R2wy +Rwm

evaluated for  and using u0(cm) = eRu0(co) we get
@

@
j=

 eRbwy   wm   hRb   eRbi @by
@
 eR+ ()2 R2wy +Rwmu0(co)
42
or
@

@ j
u0(co)
=  eRbeRwy   eRwm   eR hRb   eRbi @by
@
+ ()2

R2wy +Rwm

=
"
()2R2   eRbeR  eR hRb   eRbi u00 (cy)
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm)
#
wy
+
"
R
h
   ei+ eR h   ei eR2bu00 (cm)
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm)
#
wm
where
()2R  eR + eR h   ei eR2bu00 (cm)
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm) > 0
Consider the term
()2R2   eRbeR  eR h   eiRb u00 (cy)
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm)
Since u
00(cy)
u00(cy)+eR2bu00(cm) < 1 it follows that
()2R2   eRbeR  eR h   eiRb u00 (cy)
u00 (cy) + eR2bu00 (cm) > R
h
R  eRbi
Hence, this expression is positive if R   eRb > 0, and it follows that a su¢ cient condition
that@


@ j> 0 is R  eRb > 0.
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